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   CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1   General  
Generally, the law in Malawi does not provide for any specific number of witnesses that are 
necessary to prove a fact. Section 212 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code
1
 states that: 
Subject to this Code and any other law for the time being in force, no particular number of witnesses shall in any 
case be required for the proof of any fact. 
Thus in general, the testimony of a witness does not need to be corroborated. To this general 
rule, there are exceptions whereby there needs to be corroboration of a witness’ testimony. In 
these instances corroboration is either required as a matter of law or as a matter of practice. 
Where corroboration is required as a matter of law, a conviction cannot be entered on the 
uncorroborated evidence of one witness.
2
 Where it is required as a matter of practice, a 
conviction should be possible on the uncorroborated evidence of a single witness.  
One of the instances whereby corroboration is required as a matter of practice is the testimony 
of a complainant in a sexual offence case.
3
 The main justification for requiring corroboration in 
these sexual matters is the assumption that complainants most often fabricate these allegations.
4
 
As a result, independent evidence is sought to establish the veracity of the complainant’s 
testimony.  
Since corroboration is sought only as a matter of practice as opposed to as a matter of law, a 
conviction should be attainable on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant, so long as 
the court is convinced that the complainant is telling the truth. That, however, has not been the 
approach of the courts. Case authority has consistently stated that it should only be in very rare 
                                                 
1
 Act 36 of 1967 
2
 For example, by section 6 of the Oaths, Affirmations and Declarations Act, a conviction cannot be made on the 
unsworn evidence of a child, if it is uncorroborated. An accused also cannot be convicted on the uncorroborated 
evidence of a single witness in sedition, perjury or procuring a woman for immoral purposes: sections 140, 51 and 
101 of the Penal Code, respectively. 
3
 Regina v Mussa 1 ALR Mal 84; Tinazari v Republic 3 ALR Mal 184 ; R v Kaluwa 2 ALR Mal 356; Mariette v 
















cases that the uncorroborated testimony of a complainant should be accepted as truth.
5
 This, has 
therefore, led to far fewer convictions in sexual offences than would have been otherwise if the 
rule had not existed. Naturally, this means that many guilty sexual offenders do not receive their 
just deserts. Deterrence, therefore, is not adequately realised. Further to that, women, who are for 
the most part,
6
 victims of sexual offences, have as a result not been sufficiently protected from 
sexual predation. 
The problem with the corroboration requirement in sexual offences is that it is based on an 
improper foundation. The proffered rationale, that most complainants lie about sexual offence 
allegations, cannot be verified from empirical data.
7
 Regardless of this fact, due to the rule’s 
existence, the standard of proof in sexual offence cases is unnecessarily raised above that which 
normally obtains in other criminal cases, causing convictions in sexual offences very hard to 
come by. The rule is found to be only premised on discrimination against women. Such being the 
case, the rule runs counter to the current Constitutional order which is founded on principles of 
equality before the law, non-discrimination and the dignity of all persons.
8
 It is also against the 
Constitutional commitment of offering women full and effective protection.
9
 
This paper advocates that such an evidential rule is undesirable for it serves no useful purpose 
in the adjudication of sexual matters and that the rule is unfairly discriminatory against women 
and unconstitutional in the present Malawi constitutional regime. It further advocates that the 
rule should be abolished both by judicial pronouncement and legislatively. Since the 
corroboration requirement is a common law rule, lessons will be drawn from comparative 
common law jurisdictions which used to have the rule but have now abolished it, such as South 
Africa, Namibia, the State of California, Canada and England. To these ends, Chapter 2 will 
consider how the Malawian courts have applied the corroboration rule in sexual cases and also 
the rationale behind the rule. Criticisms against the rule will also be considered. Chapter 3 will 
examine the constitutionality of such a rule in the present Malawian constitutional regime. 
Chapter 4 will look at the judicial and legislative reforms that comparable common law 
                                                 
5
 Tinazari v Republic supra note 2 at 192; Regina v Kaluwa supra note 2 at 360 
6
 Note, ‘The rape corroboration requirement: repeal not reform’, (1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 1365 at 1372 
7
 A Thomas Morris, ‘The empirical, historical and legal case against the cautionary instruction: a call for legislative 
reform’, (1988) 1 Duke Law Journal 154 at 164 
 
8
 Section 12 of the Constitution of Malawi, 1994 
9












jurisdictions have effected in the area of corroboration in sexual offences. Chapter 5 is the 
conclusion. Before the substance of the rule is considered, there is a need to take a brief look at 
how Malawi came to have such an evidential rule. At the same time, a brief look will be made at 
the jurisdiction of courts as regards sexual offences in Malawi and also the composition of such 
courts. 
1.2   Common Law and Courts’ Jurisdiction in Sexual Cases 
Malawi was a British colony from 1892 until 1964, when Malawi gained its independence. All 
the statutory law and case law of England up to 1902 was stated to be binding on Malawi and to 
be part of Malawi law unless such law had been repealed by a Malawi Act of Parliament.
10
 Thus 
the English common law became part of Malawi law. During the colonial era and even a few 
years after Malawi gained independence, almost all of the judicial officers in the magistrate’s 
court, the High Court and the Supreme Court were from England. Therefore, even though the 
law from England that was to be part of the laws of Malawi was according to the British Order-
in-Council to be the statutes and case law of England of up to 1902, the English judicial officers 
continued to look to the English case law of after the year 1902 for guidance and interpretation 
of the Malawi laws. They looked to decisions after 1902, not because of their binding force on 
Malawi, but for their persuasive quality. Once an English decision made after 1902 was applied 
in a Malawi decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal or the High Court, that Malawian case and 
by extension the English case became by the doctrine of precedent binding on the lower courts. 
In this way then, corroboration as a doctrine generally and also specifically in sexual cases, was 
inherited from the English common law and also developed in Malawi along the same English 
case law.  
In Malawi, it is the magistrate’s court that handles the bulk of the criminal cases. The 
magistrate’s court has several strata. The magistrate court of a Resident Magistrate or of the first 
grade can try any offence under the Penal Code with the exception of homicides, treason and 
piracy; attempts and accessory offences linked to the excluded offences are also outside the 
jurisdiction of the magistrate’s court.
11
 These courts can, however, try any sexual offence.
12
 The 
                                                 
10
 British Order-in-Council of 11th August 1902 
11
 Section 13(1) of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code 
12












court of a magistrate is constituted by a single magistrate sitting alone unlike the High Court, 
which has provision for jury trial.
13
 Since a magistrate sits alone, any expression for the need of 
corroboration in a sexual offence case is articulated by the magistrate to himself; unlike in other 
jurisdictions like the United States and the United Kingdom, where these offences are mostly 
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    THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT IN SEXUAL OFFENCES IN MALAWI 
In this chapter, we will consider how the requirement for corroboration in Malawi has been 
understood, what it entails and how it has been applied. We will examine the definition and 
nature of corroboration. We will also look at what exactly in the complainant’s story has to be 
corroborated. Furthermore, we will examine what have been the justifications for requiring 
corroboration in sexual offences in Malawi and elsewhere. Criticisms of the rule will also be 
considered. The chapter then concludes on the footing that the rule is baseless and that it only 
unfairly discriminates against women.  
2.1   The corroboration requirement/warning 
It has been held by the High Court in several sexual offence cases that in such cases, the trial 
magistrate should warn himself of the danger of convicting an accused on the uncorroborated 
evidence of the complainant.
14
 This requirement is met by the magistrate recording in his written 
judgment that he is mindful of the need for corroboration in the sexual offence charge he is 
dealing with.  The trial magistrate then is to proceed to look for corroboration. The High Court 
has further held that it is only in rare cases that the magistrate should accept the uncorroborated 
testimony of a complainant.
15
 In such instances, the trial court must expressly record, firstly, that 
there is no corroboration; secondly, that it is well aware of the danger of convicting in such 
circumstances; and that despite this, it is nevertheless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the 
complainant is telling the truth.
16
 It is a ground of appeal if the court convicts without taking into 
account the absence of corroboration.
17




The High Court has not required any particular form of wording to be used when the 
magistrate is warning himself of the need for corroboration. It also has not expressed the need for 
                                                 
14
 Regina v Mussa supra note 3 at 87;  Tinazari v Regina supra note 3 at 192; Mariette v Republic supra note 3 at 
133; Republic v Kapalepale supra note 3 at 152-153 
15
 Tinazari v Regina supra note 3 at 192 
16
 Ibid  
17
 Banda v Republic 4 ALR Mal 316 
18
 Republic v Kapalepale supra note 3 at 153; Section 15 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code stipulates 
that the record of proceedings before a magistrate court in which a first offender has been sentenced to a term of 












the justification for the corroboration requirement to be included in those words beyond stating 
that corroboration is needed of the complainant’s evidence because it is a sexual offence case. 
Tinazari v. Regina
19
 was a case of indecent assault which came on appeal before the High 
Court. One of the grounds of appeal was that the trial magistrate had not adequately considered 
the question of corroboration. The High Court considered what the magistrate stated concerning 
his cognisance of the need for corroboration and affirmed the magistrate’s dictum. Bolt, J quoted 
the magistrate court’s judgment: 
I…direct myself that in this type of case it is established that I must warn myself of the danger of convicting on 
the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant; I will say at once that I am aware of the danger of convicting in 
any prosecution on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant, and of the especial danger of doing so in a case 
where the basis of the charge is an alleged sexual impropriety.
20
 
According to Bolt J, this expression for the need of corroboration was sufficient regardless of the 
fact that it never gave the rationale for making sexual offence an especial category for the 
corroboration requirement. In contrast, other jurisdictions that required the cautionary instruction 
to be given like the United States had embedded the justification for seeking corroboration in the 
instruction. In State v. Smoot,
21
 the instruction given to the jury was that: 
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this case is one, which, generally speaking, is easily made, 
but difficult to disprove even though the defendant were innocent. Therefore, I charge you the law requires that 
you examine the testimony of [the complainant] with caution.
22
 
Also in Williams v. State,
23
 the judge said to the jurors that: 
You are instructed that the crime of second degree rape, of which [the accused] is charged, is a serious one, and 
such a charge is easily made and hard to contradict or disprove; that is a character of crime that tends to create a 
prejudice against the person charged; and for these reasons, it is your duty to weigh the testimony carefully, and 
then determine the truth with deliberative judgment, uninfluenced by the nature of the charge.
24
 
In the same way, the English courts had required likewise that the justification be included in the 
warning for the corroboration warning to be a full warning as it was required that it be such in a 
sexual offence case. Thus in Spencer v. Regina
25
 Lord Ackner stated that: 
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 Supra note 3 
20
 Ibid at 191 
21
 99 Idaho 855 
22
 Ibid at 863 
23
 254 Ark. 940 
24
 Ibid at 943 
25












Where there is no corroboration, the rule of practice merely requires that the jury should be warned of the danger 
of relying upon the sole evidence…of the complainant in the sexual case…The warning to be sufficient must 
explain why it is dangerous so to act, since otherwise the warning will lack significance...
26
 
One would understand why the judge has to at least explain to the jury the justification for 
seeking corroboration. This is important so that they can appreciate its need as they exercise their 
minds upon the question. It is, however, surprising that the magistrate is not called upon to 
include such justification in their judgment. After all, this judgment is read in open court, to all 
present, including the accused and complainant. It should not be hard to see why the complainant 
would want to know why his/her evidence is treated with caution other than the fact that it is a 
sexual offence charge. 
2.2   Definition and the Nature of Corroboration 
Tinazari v. Regina
27
 defines corroborative evidence as evidence which confirms other evidence 
that an offence has been committed and that it is the accused who has committed it.
28
 In that 
case, Bolt, J quoted Lord Reading, CJ in Rex v. Baskerville
29
 for the definition of corroboration: 
We hold that evidence in corroboration must be independent testimony which affects the accused by connecting 
or tending to connect him to the crime. In other words, it must be evidence which implicates him, that is, which 




Further to this, it was stated in Rex v. Baskerville that: 
The nature of the corroboration will necessarily vary according to the particular circumstances of the offence 
charged. It would be in high degree dangerous to formulate the kind of evidence which would be regarded as 
corroboration, except to say that corroborative evidence is evidence which shows or tends to show that the story 
of [the witness to be corroborated] that the accused committed the crime is true, not merely that the crime has 
been committed, but that it has been committed by the accused. What is required is some additional evidence 




There thus needs to be shown a connection in the evidence said to be corroborative between the 
offence and the accused. In Republic v. Kapalepale
32
 the accused was convicted of rape. On 
appeal, it was held that the torn clothing of the complainant could not amount to corroboration of 
                                                 
26
 Ibid at 140 
27
 Supra note 3 
28
 Ibid at 194 
29
 [1916] 2 KB 658 
30
 Supra note 3 at 194, quoting Lord Reading, [1916] 2 KB 658 at 667 
31
 Supra  note 29 at 665 
32












the complainant’s evidence without a nexus being shown between the torn clothing and the 
accused. Since the evidence of the complainant was held to lack corroboration and since the trial 
magistrate had not warned himself of the need for corroborative evidence of the complainant’s 
account, the High Court quashed the conviction. Below we consider some of the examples of 
what has been held to be corroborative evidence. These examples are shouts or screams of a 
complainant heard by a third party at the time of the alleged offence, the distressed condition of 
the complainant soon after the alleged offence, admissions made by the accused as to the alleged 
offence and also lies told by the accused in connection to the alleged offence. 
2.2.1   Shouts and distressed condition of the complainant 
Screams from the complainant heard by an independent witness during the alleged time of the 
sexual assault have been held to be corroborative evidence of the complainant’s account.
33
 The 
distressed condition of the complainant after the alleged assault as observed by an independent 
witness has also in certain cases been held to be corroborative evidence.
34
 In Tinazari v. Regina, 
the accused was convicted of indecent assault. The accused was a recent acquaintance of the 
complainant. He came round to the complainant’s flat and the complainant invited him in. The 
accused pushed her on the settee, pinned her there and got on top of her and was removing his 
trousers. She fought him off, bit his arm and screamed. He jumped to his feet and walked out of 
the flat. Two neighbours appeared on the scene and asked the accused as to what had happened. 
These two neighbours testified to the screams they had heard, to the slight disorder of the flat and 
also to the distressed condition of the complainant at the time. On appeal, the High Court held 
that these facts were corroborative of the complainant’s story since they were observed round 
about the same time the accused was present at the flat.
35
 Of course as regards the distressed 
condition of the complainant, the High Court in the instant case held that trial courts must 
ascertain whether the alleged offence caused the hysterical condition or whether the hysteria 
gave rise to a false allegation.
36
 In the present case, taking all the other circumstances into 
account, the High Court concluded that the offence gave rise to the complainant’s distressed 
condition and not the other way round.  
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 Tinazari v. Republic supra note 3 at 197 
34
 Ibid at 198 
35














The case of Tinazari v. Regina can be contrasted with the case of Republic v Fredi.
37
 In the 
latter case, the shouts were held to have an ambiguous complexion and the complainant’s 
unhappy condition was held to be insufficient corroboration. In that case the accused and the 
complainant were at a beer party. When the party was coming to an end, the accused ordered the 
people out of the house and closed the door behind him and the complainant. The owner of the 
house heard the complainant screaming and came and opened the door. The complainant alleged 
that the accused had indecently assaulted her. At this time, the accused was assaulting the 
complainant and he then also turned and assaulted the owner of the house. 
The owner of the house testified that when he opened the house, he observed that the 
complainant looked not ‘happy’. At confirmation, the High Court stated that the complainant’s 
screams could not corroborate her story of indecent assault. This was so because the shouts were 
mere shouts which could be consistent with a common assault as well as an indecent assault.
38
 
The court contrasted these shouts with those heard in Tinazari v Republic which were to the 
effect that: ‘Don’t touch me; don’t come near me.’ The court also said that the unhappy 
condition of the complainant could have been simulated since she knew there were people 
outside.
39
 Additionally, it was stated that it was reasonable for her to be unhappy since she was 
being assaulted.
40
 The High Court substituted a conviction of common assault in the place of the 
lower court’s conviction of indecent assault.
41
 
In the light of this safeguard of ascertaining that the hysteria did not bring about the sexual 
assault allegation, it can be seen as will also be shown below, that it has been supposed that 
women fabricate sexual offence allegations from some other motives or out of hysteria, and 
hence the enunciation of the corroboration rules. 
2.2.2   Admissions and Lies told by the accused 
A confession can provide corroboration. In Regina v. Magombani,
42
 the complainant was a girl 
whom the trial court recorded to be under twelve years of age. She testified that the accused had 
                                                 
37
 8 MLR 48 
38
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41
 Ibid at 54 
42












led her into the bush and indecently assaulted her. A police officer had testified that he had been 
shown a place, which place the girl said was where the accused had struggled with her. This was 
done in the presence of the accused. The accused admitted to the officer that this had indeed been 
so. The officer found signs of a struggle in that place. In his defence, the accused said he had 
nothing to say except that he admitted the offence. On the question of corroboration, it was held 
that the accused’s admission would amount to corroboration.
43
  
 Lies told by the accused have also been held to amount to corroboration of the complainant’s 
story in certain instances. In Regina v. Kaluwa,
44
 the girl of about fourteen years of age had 
testified that while on a village path, she met the accused, who pushed her down and had sexual 
intercourse with her. On medical examination, the girl’s private parts were found to be swollen 
and inflamed. The hymen was found to have been recently torn and there was bad bruising inside 
her vagina. The girl could hardly walk. There were semen-like stains on her underclothing. 
The High Court, on review, stated that there was no doubt that the girl had had sexual 
intercourse for the first time.
45
 What remained, the court stated, was corroborative evidence on 
whether, she had had it with the accused and also whether she had consented to it or not.
46
 
On arrest, the accused made a statement after being cautioned and stated that: ‘I agree that I 
got hold of the girl intending to have carnal knowledge of her’. The following day, as the 
accused was about to say something, the police officer cautioned him again. The accused then 
admitted to having raped a girl, but not the complainant. 
The High Court, then, held that on the authority of Credland v. Knowler,
47
 the first statement 
which was an admission of an incriminating fact would corroborate the girl both on identity and 
lack of consent.
48
 It was stated that although a lie told by an accused person does not normally 
amount to corroboration of the complainant’s evidence, it may do so if it is of such a nature and 
made in such circumstances as to lead to an inference in support of the complainant’s evidence, 
                                                 
43
 Ibid at 399 
44
 Supra note 3 
45
 Ibid at 360 
46
 Ibid at 362; The Penal Code makes a distinction in sexual offences between rape and defilement; defilement is 
where a man has sexual intercourse with a girl under 13 and consent by the girl is immaterial: section 137 of the 
Penal Code 
47
 35 Cr. App. R. 48 
48












or if it gives to a proved opportunity a different complexion from what that opportunity would 
have borne if no lie had been told.
49
 The accused’s statement was held to be corroboration 
because it was consistent with the complainant’s account even though the accused had not 
admitted to finally having sexual intercourse with the girl. The accused having later made a 
contradictory exculpatory statement showed that he was untruthful and that he was trying to hide 
what happened at the opportunity he had had with the complainant, which opportunity was 
proved by the complainant’s evidence and his first statement.  
2.3   The Extraneousness of Corroboration 
Corroboration has been held to be extraneous to the complainant with the exception of where a 
witness testifies as to the distressed appearance of the complainant.
50
 Thus if a complainant tells 
someone else of her having been sexually assaulted, the person to whom the complainant made 
her complaint can testify that the complaint was made, but such evidence does not amount to 
corroboration. It is only evidence showing her consistency. In Mariette v. Republic,
51
 it was said 
that in a sexual case, where a complaint was made by a prosecutrix shortly after the alleged 
occurrence, the particulars of the complaint may be given in evidence, on the part of the 
prosecution, not as evidence of the truth of those facts but as evidence of the consistency of the 
conduct of the prosecutrix, that the story told by her in the witness-box could be accepted on 
trust and as negativing consent on her part. For as, it was stated in Tinazari v. Regina: 
A girl cannot corroborate herself, otherwise it is only necessary for her to repeat her story some twenty-five times 
in order to get twenty-five corroborations of it.
52
 
These previous consistent statements in sexual offences are rather an exception to the rule 
against hearsay evidence. The rule stems from the old English law which required the 
complainant to have shown ‘hue and cry’: 
go at once and while the deed is newly done, with hue and cry, to the neighbouring townships and there show the 
injury done to her to men of good repute, the blood and clothing stained with blood, and her torn garments.
53
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 Ibid at 365 
50
 Tinazari v. Republic supra note 3 
51
 Supra note 3 at 134 
52
 Supra note 3 at 194, Bolt J quoting Lord Hewart, C.J. in Rex v. Whitehead [1929] 1 KB 99 at 102 
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 H de Bracton cited in PJ Schwikkard, ‘Getting somewhere slowly-The revision of a few evidence rules’, in L Artz 













It is because the courts feared the danger that a complainant in a sexual case may have fabricated 
the allegation that they began to allow previous consistent statements to show the complainant’s 
consistency.
54
 Of course the rule has been criticised for favouring the complainant unfairly over 
the accused since the accused cannot lead similar evidence.
55
 On the other hand, the rule is 
criticised for giving the defence a loophole in the complainant’s evidence if she did not complain 
at the first reasonable opportunity.
56
 Yet it has been argued that these rules came up at a time 
when there was not enough understanding about the psychology of the rape victims. It was not 
understood at the time that there are ‘many psychological and social factors which may inhibit a 
rape survivor from making a complaint such as fear for retaliation by the offender, self-blame 
and fear of having to testify’.
57
 As such, it has been argued that not complaining at the first 
reasonable time is not a reliable way of assessing the complainant’s credibility.
58
 
2.4   What Needs to be Corroborated? 
It has been stated that the requirement for corroboration does not mean that there should be 
independent evidence confirming the whole story of the witness who needs to be corroborated. 
This is because if there is another witness whose evidence covers the whole matter, then there is 
no need to call the witness whose evidence requires corroboration.
59
 Where there is no question 
that the complainant had sexual intercourse or was indecently assaulted, the court has required 





 a case of indecent assault, it was held that although the court was to look 
for independent evidence confirming that the full offence charged had been committed, it did not 
mean that a conviction was unattainable if there was no corroboration of the alleged indecency. 
The court reasoned that if the proposition of law was that there was to be corroborative evidence 
of the alleged indecency before a conviction could be arrived at, as defence counsel had argued, 
then there would be no conviction for indecent assault except ‘in those rare cases where the court 
                                                 
54
 PJ Schwikkard, ‘Getting somewhere slowly-The revision of a few evidence rules’, supra note 53 at 87  
55




 Ibid  
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 Ibid  
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 Credland v Knowler supra note 47 at 56 
60
 Regina v Kaluwa supra note 3 at 362; Mariette v Republic supra note 3 at 125   
61












after proper warning accepted without corroboration the complainant’s testimony’.
62
 It therefore 
would be almost impossible in many cases to prove the case. It was stated that while a woman 
who has been raped after a struggle, may exhibit injuries on her body that may not be the case in 
most indecent assault cases. For example, where a man handles a woman’s breast without her 
consent, there may not be marks afterwards to confirm the woman’s testimony.
63
 
The test therefore for corroborative evidence in Tinazari was stated to be whether there is 
independent evidence tending to confirm the truth of the account of the witness to be 
corroborated and tending to show that it is reasonably safe to act upon it.
64
 It was stated in that 
case that what was crucial was the confirmation of the veracity of the witness for whom 
corroboration is required. The court, however in Tinazari, was quick to point out that this test 
does not derogate from the other elements of corroboration, which were that the corroborative 
evidence must show that a crime has been committed and also that, it is the accused who has 
committed it.
65
 Thus on this test, the distressed condition of a woman soon after the alleged 
offence, can amount to corroboration, so long as it can be linked to the accused and even though 
such corroborative evidence does not necessarily confirm that any indecency has taken place. 
In the latter case of Mariette v. Republic,
66
 Cram J seems to have applied a more stringent test 
to the one in Tinazari. In Mariette, the complainant a sixteen year old girl testified that she was 
walking home when the accused gave her a lift in his car to take her to her house. She knew the 
accused lived in a neighbouring house to her house although the two had never spoken to each 
other before this day. The accused drove away from his house and then stopped the car in a 
solitary place. He forced her to lie down in the car. The complainant demonstrated to the trial 
court the position she was forced to lie. She said she saw the accused undo his trouser buttons 
and pull out his penis. He lay over her and put his penis into her vagina. She said she felt pain. 
She saw semen on her dress and petticoat. The trial court convicted the accused of rape. 
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The accused appealed on the ground that penetration by the penis
67
 had not been proved and 
also that the trial court had not given a full direction on corroboration. In his evidence, he stated 
that he had seen the girl earlier that day talking to a certain bicyclist whom he believed was the 
one with whom she had had the sexual intercourse. He also stated that at the solitary place, he 
had asked the girl to have sexual intercourse with him and that she had agreed to this. Yet when 
he told her to lie down, she refused. He said it became physically impossible to have sexual 
intercourse with her for his male organ was unable to reach beyond the middle of her thighs in 
her upright position. He stated that he therefore had to satisfy himself by external orgasm. 
Cram J found that the medical evidence conclusively established the fact that the girl had had 
sexual relations for the first time from the injuries observed and the presence of semen on her 
clothes.
68
 He ruled out the possibility that the girl had had sexual intercourse with the bicyclist. 
He stated that, should the girl’s injuries have come after her intercourse with the bicyclist, she 




Cram J, however, said that since the girl had testified that the accused had held his one hand 
over her mouth and nose and that since she was lying at an awkward angle in the small car, the 
accused’s hand would have interfered with her vision. He stated that she therefore could not see 
what was happening between her legs.
70
 While she could have seen the accused unbutton his 
trousers and take out his penis, because of her inexperience, she could not have been able to tell 
what had actually penetrated her.
71
 The medical officer had testified that while there was a 
possibility that a finger could have ruptured the hymen in the two places, he was of the opinion 
that the bruises he found on the inner and outer lips could not have been caused by a finger. Even 
though Cram J conceded that he could not know the position in which the girl was forced into by 
the accused in the car, for the girl had demonstrated this only to the trial court, he still concluded 
that the accused could not have achieved penetration with a penis in the car.
72
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It was thus held, that while the accused’s own admissions afforded corroboration of his 
identity and also that her bleeding nose spoke of her non-consent, penetration by the accused’s 
penis was not corroborated.
73
 Even though the court conceded that the slightest penetration of the 
male organ sufficed to constitute the offence, the court held that, in this case the complainant 
may have believed wrongly that she was penetrated by a penis. The appellate court thus 
substituted a conviction of attempted rape for the trial court’s conviction of rape. The principle in 
this case can therefore be contrasted with the one in Tinazari in that in Mariette, corroboration of 
an element of the offence, that is the penetration, was sought. In Tinazari, the corroboration of 
the element of the offence, the indecency, was not sought.                                                           
2.5   Justification for Requiring Corroboration 
The justification for the corroboration requirement in the Malawian cases has not been fully 
explained. The rule has to a great extent just been accepted as the legacy of the common law and 
not been questioned. In Regina v Mussa,
74
 the High Court somehow gave that rationale when 
Seton CJ stated that: 
The objection to convicting a person charged with a sexual offence upon the uncorroborated evidence of the 
complainant is that it is a case of an oath against an oath in circumstances where experience has shown that there 
is a special danger in relying on the testimony of a single witness uncorroborated.
75
 
The same justification for requiring corroboration was given in Mariette v. Republic.
76
 In Rex v. 
Kaluwa,
77
 Cram J, after agreeing with the rationale that corroboration is sought because it is a 
case of an oath against an oath went on to state that corroboration is also required because 
complainants are prone to lying. He stated: 
…the common practice from the experience of judges is to look for corroboration in sexual offences because of 
the great risk of false accusation.
78
 
Cram J went on to state that a woman complaining of rape is in an analogous situation to an 
accomplice in terms of her propensity to fabricate the allegation:  
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An accomplice is a witness against whom, a warning must be given because he is under a temptation to lie. The 
prosecutrix in a rape case, if a guilty woman, is under exactly the same temptation and the direction in her regard 
must be the same. That is, the possibility of false accusation should lead to a warning.
79
 
The above quotation is no different from the justifications that have been put forward for the 
corroboration requirement in other jurisdictions where it has also been upheld. It is generally 
believed that sexual offences accusations are ‘easily to be made and hard to be proved, and 
harder to be defended…’
80
 It has also been stated that corroboration is required because the 
penalties especially of rape are severe.
81
 Furthermore, it is also stated that, in sexual offence 
cases, the judge and the jury are often sympathetic towards the complainant and prejudiced 
against the accused.
82
 Thus to avoid unjust convictions of innocent accused, the corroboration 
requirement is employed. We will now consider these justifications which can be grouped into 
two categories, that is, the frequency of false sexual offence charges and the difficulty in 
defending against a sexual offence charge. We will also consider the criticisms against these. In 
connection with these proffered justifications, we will consider whether the definition of 
corroboration as given in R. v. Baskerville
83
 can be properly stated to tally with these 
justifications. Furthermore, we will look at the inflexible nature of the corroboration 
requirement. We conclude the chapter by drawing the conclusion that the corroboration rule 
serves no useful purpose other than being discriminatory against women. 
2.5.1   The Frequency of False Sexual Offence Charges 
It is believed that there are a number of different motives that can induce a complainant to 
fabricate sexual offence accusations. Glanville Williams states that sexual offences are 
particularly subject to danger of deliberate false charges ‘resulting from sexual neurosis, fantasy, 
jealousy, spite or simply a girl’s refusal to admit that she consented to an act of which she is now 
ashamed of.’
84
 It is also stated that a woman may have become pregnant and she may fabricate 
such charges against an entirely innocent man so that she shields the man who is really 
responsible for her condition.
85
 Again, she can make up false charges for the purpose of 
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blackmail or out of revenge or for notoriety.
86
 Furthermore, it is assumed that women peculiarly 




It has, however, not been convincingly proved that sexual offence complainants are so good at 
lying that juries are unable to discern the falsehood.
88
 Furthermore, it is argued that there are 
several deterrent factors that work against fabrication of sexual accusations. Firstly, there is the 
‘stigma that attach to an incident culturally defined as sordid, and the humiliation caused by 
some forms of publicity associated with such charges.’
89
 It is actually believed that this is one of 
the very strong reasons why rape is highly underreported and especially in the African context as 
stated in the Botswana Emang Basadi Women Association report: 
Although one cannot state with certainty why some victims never report such crimes, it is widely believed that 
parents may want to prevent publicity, further ordeal and emotional injury to the young victim. A victim may fear 
being accused of provocation, active participation or irresponsibility. She may experience shame or a desire to 
protect her reputation. She may also fear the reaction of her husband, boyfriend or parent…or may feel that their 




The complainant also has to consider the difficulty of facing the accused in court in recounting 
the sexual assault and also the brutal cross examination of her sexual mores by the defence 
counsel.
91
 There is also the fear of retaliation from the accused or his friends.
92
 
It is asserted these factors are so strong as to discourage the reporting of sexual offences to the 
extent that statistics indicate that rape is one of the most under-reported crimes among the 
felonies.
93
 Furthermore, even if the complainant reports the offence, she may refuse to go and 
testify, ‘in large part to avoid having to relive a traumatic and humiliating experience for the 
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benefit of the judge and the jury.’
94
 MacCahill et al quoted by Thomas Morris give an apt 
description of such humiliation: 
[The rape trial] meets all…conditions of successful degradation ceremonies. She [the victim] must testify (he [the 
defendant] need not) and thereby be confronted and transformed into something viewed as inferior in the local 
scheme of social types…Indeed it is before many witnesses that the victim is denounced and motives 
questioned…Fears and emotional turmoil that may have subsided earlier are once again aroused…It is not 
surprising, therefore, to find that it is in the realm of nightmares, heterosexual relationships, and social activities 
that adjustment difficulties are likely to develop for the victim who has been to trial.
95
   
Of course, some may think that motives such as blackmail can be so strong as to overcome a 
complainant’s fear of publicity and humiliation. It is, however, unlikely that a great number of 
women would rather fabricate a rape accusation and endure a rape trial ordeal than fabricate a 
non-sexual offence accusation, which will not expose them to such humiliation.
96
 Further, such a 
‘number will almost certainly be so small that modern techniques of criminal investigation and 
traditional legal rules, other than the corroboration requirement, will effectively protect innocent 
defendants’.
97
 Strangely enough, other physical assaults, which are also capable of being made 
the subject of false accusations are not ridden with the corroboration requirement.
98
 
2.5.2   Difficulty in Defending Against a Sexual Offence Charge 
It has been stated that sexual offences are easy to make and yet hard to disprove. As regards rape, 
it has been stated:   
If the defendant was never alone with the prosecutrix at all, he may be fortunate enough to have an alibi. But if he 
has not, or if the prosecution can show that he was with her when the crime allegedly occurred, how is he to show 
that he never achieved penetration, or that she consented.
99
 
Of course, sexual encounters occur in private and may leave no trace of whether the act took 
place or not; or if it did, if the complainant consented or not. As such, indeed, the question of 
whether or not a crime took place may turn on the conflicting testimony of the complainant and 
the accused.
100
 Yet the corroboration requirement is ‘in effect…a prior determination that if the 
prosecution’s case stands solely on the testimony of the complainant, the defendant shall win’.
101
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It is difficult to see why this should be the case when the presiding officer is privileged to ‘have 
available the usual criteria of demeanour and coherence of the witness under cross examination 
and the evidence of surrounding circumstances’,
102
 just like in all other cases where the 
prosecution case turns on the evidence of one witness. In fact, it is argued that rape is easier to 
disprove than other violent offences for the victim is the focus in rape trials and not the 
defendant.
103
 Thomas Morris states that unlike trials for other violent offences, the focus in rape 
trials is usually on the victim’s behaviour rather than the accused. The defence counsel is set on 
blaming the victim and thereby destroying her credibility. She writes: 
The shifting of focus is accomplished through a lengthy and often explicit cross-examination of the victim. 
Typical subjects examined include the resistance of the victim to her attacker, their past relationship, the victim’s 
sexual history and character, her emotional state, and the promptness with which she reported the rape. As a 
result, the jury may base its decision on the character of the victim rather than on the guilt of the defendant. If the 




Studies done show that most jurors have false preconceptions about rape victims, such as, that 
women concoct stories about rape and that women invite rape by their physical appearance and 
by their behaviour.
105
 Most jurors, therefore, rarely convict a male accused of rape in the absence 
of aggravating circumstances such as the use of a gun or physical violence.
106
 It is actually this 
focus on the complainant and the blame that is ascribed to her that causes rape to have the lowest 
conviction rates among the felonies.
107
 It is therefore not true that the nature of the offence such 
as rape or any other sexual offence causes the jury to be sympathetic towards the complainant as 
opposed to the accused. Actually, there are usually no jury trials in rape in Malawi and so the 
magistrate sits alone. It is, therefore, expected that such a magistrate should be a competent 
professional who will keep a level head and exercise sound judgment.
108
 As such, a requirement 
that the magistrate should give a corroboration warning to himself is quite absurd. Even if there 
were jury trials in sexual offences in Malawi, as already shown above, the evidence does not 
show that jurors are more inclined to believe the complainant rather than the accused. It is 
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therefore submitted that rape or any other sexual offence is not a crime that is difficult to 
disprove.   
2.6   Criticisms against the Baskerville formula 
From the rationales stated above, it can be observed that it is the complainant’s credibility that is 
doubted in a sexual offence case. Thus it would seem logical that evidence which shows that she 
is a truthful witness would be the one that would be sought to avoid convictions on fabricated 
sexual offence accusations. Yet this has not been the legal approach. The law as embodied in 
Baskerville has gone over and above this simple requirement. Its effect is to seek ‘confirmation 
of the accused’s guilt, not of the truthfulness of the witness’s testimony’.
109
  The confirmation of 
the veracity of the suspect witness’s testimony is only incidental and of little value unless it leads 
to the confirmation of the accused’s guilt.
110
 It has further been stated that after the English 
decision of R v Beck,
111
 it can safely be argued that confirmation of the suspect witness’s 
testimony is an irrelevant consideration and that all that is needed is independent evidence 
confirming the accused’s guilt.
112
 Bronitt makes this conclusion based on the fact that Lord 
Ackner in Beck had rejected defence counsel’s submission that corroboration needed to confirm 
a piece of evidence given by the suspect witness.
113
 Instead Lord Ackner had stated that a piece 
of evidence could amount to corroboration even though it did not relate to what the suspect 
witness had testified to.
114
 Such being the case then, Lord Ackner’s proposition on corroboration 




The Baskerville test for corroboration has thus been criticised for being ‘too stringent since 
there may be cases where although the circumstances may be such as to remove any doubt from 
the veracity of the witness, yet they cannot be regarded as sufficient corroboration under this 
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 Birch gives the example of a scenario where the prosecutrix makes a complaint of 
a sexual offence to her sister and which tallies with her account in court. She envisages that the 
jury could perfectly reason that the complaint though not corroborating the prosecutrix’ 
testimony in court, satisfies them that it is safe to accept the truthfulness of the prosecutrix’ 
uncorroborated account. She thus asks why there should be a distinction made between evidence 
which is ‘strictly corroborative’ and that which merely supports the prosecutrix’ credibility?
117
 
Indeed Dickson J in R v Vetrovec
118
 called Lord Reading CJ’s approach in Baskerville as 
‘over-cautious’. He reasoned that since we believe that the witness has good reason to lie, some 
other piece of evidence is sought to establish that the witness is telling the truth. He was of the 
view that, while evidence which implicates the accused does serve to accomplish this purpose, 
that is not the only kind of evidence that can establish the witness’ credibility. 
He also quoted Wigmore who writes: 
…whatever restores our trust in [the witness] restores it as a whole; if we find that he is desiring and intending to 
tell a true story, we shall believe one part of his story as well as another; whenever, then, by any means, that trust 
is restored, our object is accomplished, and it cannot matter whether the efficient circumstance related to the 




He further illustrated his point by citing the case of R v Murphy.
120
 In that case, the two 
appellants had picked up the 16-year-old complainant in their car in the early hours of the 
morning and driven her to their basement apartment which comprised a sitting room and a 
bedroom. She alleged that it was there at the apartment that the two appellants had sexual 
intercourse with her without her consent. Murphy admitted having had sexual intercourse with 
the complainant but said that the complainant had consented to the act. Butt said he never even 
had sexual intercourse with the complainant and claimed that upon reaching the apartment, he 
had immediately retired to bed. Murphy then drove her to a bus station where she telephoned her 
cousin. Her cousin testified to her distressed condition. The complainant had also telephoned the 
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police and the officer also testified to her distraught condition. The relevant portion of the 
provision requiring corroboration read: 
…the judge shall, if the only evidence that implicates the accused is the evidence , given under oath, of the female 
person in respect of whom the offence is alleged to have been committed and that evidence is not corroborated in 
a material particular by evidence that implicates the accused, instruct the jury that it is not safe to find the accused 
guilty in the absence of such corroboration, but that they are entitled to find the accused guilty if they are satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that her evidence is true.
121
 
The trial judge in that case then gave an instruction to the jury that the complainant’s distressed 
condition was capable of amounting to corroboration against both accused: 
Now, I tell you as a matter of law that the only evidence capable of being considered by you as corroboration of 
the complainant’s testimony with respect to each accused, if you believe that evidence of her distraught condition 
as described by her cousin…and the police constable who picked her up at the bus depot.
122
 
The case then turned on whether the complainant’s distressed condition was corroboration of her 
evidence against Murphy as well as against Butt. The above cited Canadian provision that 
required corroboration, on a strict interpretation, was along the Baskerville formulation of 
corroboration.  Yet, the trial judge had not taken that approach. Since Murphy had admitted to 
having had sexual intercourse with her, his admission corroborated the complainant as to 
identity. The distressed condition could, on the Baskerville test, only show non-consent of the 
complainant as regards the sexual intercourse that took place between her and Murphy, and so 
Murphy could be implicated. It, however, by itself could not directly implicate Butt, for that 
evidence did not identify him as a rapist as well. On appeal, the court held that the trial judge’s 
reasoning was correct in instructing the jury that the distraught condition of the complainant was 
capable of corroborating the whole of her evidence in respect of the guilt of both accused. The 
court stated that: 
It is a material particular of that evidence which must be corroborated. There is no requirement that the whole of 
her evidence be corroborated. Were that the requirement, there would be no need for even the evidence of the 
complainant. The so-called corroborative evidence would be sufficient for a conviction.
123
 
With this reinterpretation of the Baskerville test, the court was able to circumvent the strict 
definition of what corroborative evidence was to constitute. 
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2.7   The inflexibility and complexity of the corroboration warning 
The Law Commission in England in the proposals that led to the abrogation of the corroboration 
requirement pointed out that there was ‘no justification for automatically applying the same rules 
to the evidence of all witnesses’ who fall in the category of complainants in a sexual offence.
124
 
The corroboration requirement in sexual offence cases was there understood as ‘patronising’ and 
‘a particular slur on women’.
125
 As Birch writes, the inflexibility of the rules meant that a 
direction was required ‘whatever the trial judge’s assessment of the reliability of the evidence or 
the assistance that the jury needs to be given in assessing it.’
126
 In the context of a jury trial, the 
warning then had the capability of accomplishing the opposite of the trial judge’s duty of giving 
the jury the assistance necessary to the facts and ‘risked impairing the respect of the jury for the 
rest of what the judge might have to say.’
127
 This was stated in R v Chance:
128
  
If he [the judge] is required to apply rigid rules, there will inevitably be occasions when the directions will be 
inappropriate to the facts. Juries are quick to spot such anomalies, and will understandably view the anomaly, and 
often, as a result of the directions with suspicion, thus undermining the judge’s purpose. 
In the Malawian context, the magistrate is not giving the warning to the jury but to himself. Yet, 
the inflexible nature of the corroboration warning is still problematic. It is imprudent for the 
court to mouth the warning as a ritual when the court is convinced of the credibility of the 
complainant’s evidence. It serves no useful purpose. 
The Law Commission also criticised the corroboration requirement for complexity.
129
 It was 
pointed out that the Baskerville direction was very difficult to explain to the jury. As such, the 
rules as to what amounted to corroboration being complex were the ‘cause of many actual or 
alleged errors and of many appeals.’
130
 Dickson J thus saw no useful purpose in the ‘welter of 
legal niceties which either goes over a jury’s head and leaves them confused, or else is 
understood and then ignored as contrary to common sense’.
131
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2.8   Discrimination against Women 
The rule finds no reasonable justification as to its existence and can therefore only be explained 
on the basis that it is based on the erroneous ‘misogynist assumption that women are duplicitous, 
sexually and otherwise’
132
 when there is no empirical evidence to support the assertion that more 
false accusations are made by in sexual assaults than any other crimes.
133
 Thus it can safely be 
concluded that the only purpose of the corroboration requirement is to discriminate against 
women. Although it may be argued that the rule applies to both men and women, the fact is that 
the majority of sexual offence complaints are made by women.
134
 Schwikkard also decries this 
argument by stating that ‘a claim of gender neutrality is difficult to sustain…when the historical 
framing of the rule in terms of female psychology taken into account’.
135
 She then quotes 
Wigmore and also Glanville Williams.
136
 Wigmore wrote: 
Modern psychiatrists have amply studied the behaviour of errant young girls and women coming before the court 
in all sorts of cases. Their psychic complexes are multifarious, distorted partly by inherent defect, partly by 
diseased derangements or abnormal instincts, partly by bad environment, partly by temporary physiological or 
emotional conditions. One form taken by these complexes is that of contriving false charges of sexual offences by 
men. The unchaste…mentality finds incidental but direct expression in the narrations of imaginary sex incidents 
of which the narrator is the heroine or the victim. On the surface the narration is straightforward and convincing. 
The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man; for the respect and sympathy naturally felt 
by any tribunal for a wronged female helps to give easy credit to such a plausible tale.
137
 
Since the corroboration requirement is seen to be discriminatory against women, we will need to 
subject it to the current Constitution’s enunciations of the right to equality before the law and 
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       THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT 
During the colonial era, there was no proper legal instrument guaranteeing the human rights of 
the Malawian people. When the country became independent in 1964, there was made mention 
in the 1964 Constitution, in a cursory way, that the state would recognise the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.
138
 Later on, with the establishment of a republic and the adoption 
of a Constitution that constituted such, as well as with the dictatorial leadership that was just 
beginning, the provision that spoke of human rights was strategically omitted from the 
Republican Constitution of 1964. It was only in 1994, when Malawi adopted a democratic type 
of governance that the country adopted a Constitution which enshrined a proper Bill of rights. 
This Constitution expressly states that it shall be the supreme arbiter and ultimate authority in the 
interpretation of all laws.
139
 It goes even further to state that— 
In the application and formulation of any Act of Parliament and in the application and development of the 




Specifically, this entails that, in interpreting the Constitution, the court must seek to promote the 
values which underlie an open and democratic society.
141
 It also must take full account of the 
fundamental principles upon which the Constitution is founded and also the Bill of rights.
142
 One 
such fundamental principle underlying the Constitution is the issue that the inherent dignity and 
worth of each human being requires that the state and all people should recognise and protect 
fundamental human rights and also afford fullest protection to those rights.
143
 As a principle of 
national policy, the state is obliged to actively promote the welfare and development of the 
people of Malawi by progressively adopting and implementing policies and legislation aimed at 
achieving gender equality between men and women.
144
 Gender equality has been envisaged to be 
achieved through implementation of principles of non-discrimination and also the 
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implementation of policies that address social issues like domestic violence.
145
 The Constitution 
has also built its foundation on the principle of equality of status of all persons before the law.
146
 
As such, the only justifiable limitations to lawful rights have been stated to be those that are 
necessary to ensure peaceful interaction in an open and democratic society.
147
 
The Constitution enshrines the right to equality before the law to all its citizens as well as the 
right not to be discriminated against.
148
 The Constitution, however, has gone further than just 
guaranteeing rights to the general population. It has guaranteed specific rights for women.  
Although Malawi has put in place the right constitutional framework, it is unfortunate that it 
has not been as diligent in developing its jurisprudence in the interpretation of these rights. As 
such, most of its laws especially those that deal with women have remained unchanged and are 
usually incompatible with the spirit of the Constitution. A good example of such legal rules is the 
corroboration requirement which is under consideration here. 
Due to the lack of jurisprudence in the interpretation of the provisions on rights, recourse will 
be had to legal pronouncements from jurisdictions like South Africa, Namibia and Canada. The 
South African rights provisions are similar in their wording to the provisions in the Malawi 
Constitution. Further to that, the Constitution provides that, where applicable, the courts are to 
have regard to comparable foreign case law in the interpretation of the Constitution.
149
 
3.1   The right to equality and the right of protection of women  
The right to equality of all people before the law and hence the right not to be discriminated 
against is guaranteed in Section 20 of the Constitution which stipulates— 
(1)  Discrimination of persons in any form is prohibited and all persons are, under any law, guaranteed equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on grounds of…sex… 
(2) Legislation may be passed addressing inequalities in society and prohibiting discriminatory practices and may 
render such practices criminally punishable by the courts.  
Additionally, women in particular, are recognised to be equal with all other citizens under 
Section 24(1) of the Constitution which stipulates— 
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Women have the right to full and equal protection by the law, and have the right not to be discriminated against 
on the basis of their gender… 
(2) Any law that discriminates against women on the basis of gender… shall be invalid and legislation shall be 
passed to eliminate customs and practices that discriminate against women, particularly practices such as— 
           (a) sexual abuse, harassment and violence; 
In the Canadian case of Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,
150
 discrimination was 
defined as follows: 
…a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the 
individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disadvantages on such individual or 
group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages 
available to other members of society. Distinctions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual 
solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based 
on an individual’s merits and capacities will rarely be so classified. 
The corroboration requirement is employed in the case of sexual offence complainants. Yet, in 
practice, it is female sexual offence complainants that the rule targets. Rex v Kaluwa
151
 illustrates 
the point that it is actually the testimony of women that the rule aims at burdening with the 
further obligation of some other evidence from another witness before a conviction can be 
arrived at. In that case, in explaining the reason for requiring corroboration, the testimony of a 
woman who complained of rape was held to be analogous to that of an accomplice: 
An accomplice is a witness against whom, a warning must be given because he is under a temptation to lie. The 
prosecutrix in a rape case, if a guilty woman, is under exactly the same temptation and the direction in her regard 
must be the same. That is, the possibility of false accusation should lead to a warning.
152
 
Thus women complaining of ape or sexual offences are singled out as being a category of 
people that are likely to fabricate sexual complaints. The qualification of ‘if a guilty woman’ 
does not help matters to show that it is only a specified category of women that are being 
targeted. From the court’s reasoning, fabrication of rape cases seems to be so pervasive among 
women that the giving of the warning is to be made in all cases of rape. The inference is that 
there are more guilty women in sexual complaints than there are innocent women. The court did 
not go on to express what that guilty woman would be guilty of. It can safely be concluded, 
though, from the rationales that have been given for requiring the corroboration rule, that this 
guilt would be emanating from the fact that the woman is guilty of an improper motive which 
then spurs her on to lay a false rape allegation. 
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Since women complaining of sexual offences are characterised as having impure motives for 
laying sexual offence charges, a distinction is made concerning their evidence. It is treated with 
suspicion and corroboration is to be sought for it. That does place the women’s evidence at a 
disadvantage for it is not treated on the same footing as evidence of other members of society, 
especially men. Of course, as it was held in Republic v Chinthiti,
153
 the making of distinctions is 
not in itself illegal, but that there is need to demonstrate the illegality obtaining in the distinctions 
made. 
Firstly, it must be pointed out that this discrimination is on a ground that section 20 of the 
Constitution specifically mentions, that is, the ground of sex. The court in R v Kaluwa
154
 was 
very eloquent on what the corroboration requirement secures against, which was, guilty women. 
It might be argued that the corroboration requirement applies to all complainants of sexual 
offences, whether male or female, yet it must be noted that the overwhelming number of 
complainants in sexual offences are female and the majority of perpetrators of such are male.
155
 
Secondly, it is important to note that the assertion that women, for the most part, fabricate sexual 
offence charges cannot be supported by empirical evidence. As such, the treatment of women 
complainant’s evidence as evidence of a suspicious nature is unjustified since the reason given 
for treating their evidence with suspicion is fallacious.  
In the Namibian case of S v D,
156
 Frank J, albeit obiter, made mention of how the 
corroboration requirement is contrary to the right to equality of persons before the law. He 
dismissed the notion that sexual offence allegations are easily made for the lack of empirical data 
validating that idea. In fact, he stated, that the data showed that the number of false charges being 
laid in respect of sexual offences is the same as those laid in other felonies.
157
 Frank J further 
questioned why it was that the courts could only speculate on the various motives of laying a 
false charge in a sexual offence case despite there being no evidence to establish such a motive 
and yet courts were not doing likewise in other criminal cases. After all, as he found, false 
charges are laid in all offences and not just in sexual offences only. At the same time, as already 
stated, there was no evidence to show that more sexual offence charges are laid in sexual 
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offences than in any other felony. He reviewed the ‘stunningly imaginative approach’ taken by 
the court in S v Balhuber
158
 which stated as follows: 
In the present case, a number of possible motives for the complainant to have acted as the appellant alleged she 
did suggest themselves. She may have been overcome by shame, disgust or remorse (perhaps even alcoholic 
remorse) at the fact that she had consented to intercourse with the appellant; she may have been sexually 
frustrated because of the appellant’s drunken state (he may have realised that they both did not enjoy the act); she 
may have been filled with revulsion at the unusual sexual acts to which the appellant had wanted had wanted her 
to submit, whether or not she was a willing party to such acts (as distinct from the act of intercourse); or she may 
have simply become afraid, with the coming of the morning, that her male friend would arrive at the flat. It is true 
that these possibilities are speculative and that a court is not usually required on possibilities having no 
foundation in the evidence placed before it…but if the appellant was telling the truth there was no way in which 
he could have offered any explanation in evidence for the complainant’s conduct, and possibilities of the kind I 
have mentioned are inherently present in the circumstances of a case such as the present. It is precisely because of 
the difficulty of discerning hidden motives that cases of this nature require special treatment.
159
 
It was Frank J’s considered view that whether a hidden motive would be found in a given case 
would depend on the ‘fecundity of the presiding officer’s imagination’.
160
 The fact that there was 
no empirical evidence to show that there are more false sexual offence allegations laid than false 
allegation in other felonies, but rather that there was a generalisation that most sexual assault 
allegations are false drawn from sporadic incidents of fabrication, and that most sexual offence 
complainants are women, led Frank J. to the conclusion that the corroboration requirement was 
discriminatory against women.
161
 It offended the constitutional principle of all people being 
equal before the law regardless of sex. It discriminated against the women complainants who 
were the victims of crime perpetrated by men; it offered men the privilege of a higher than 
ordinary standard of proof in order to be found guilty of the sexual offence they had committed 
against women. 
Indeed the sentiments expressed by Frank J were also made by the American judge, Armand 




I find that the giving of such an instruction in this case is unwarranted either by law or reason in that it arbitrarily 
discriminates against women, denies them equal protection of the law and assists in the brutalization of rape 
victims by providing an unequal balance between their rights and the rights of the accused in court.
163
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In the above stated case, the accused then appealed to the Supreme Court solely on the ground 
that the trial court had not given the corroboration instruction to the jury. The appellate court, 
however, dismissed his appeal. It reviewed empirical data of sexual offences convictions and 
concluded that the data did not bear out the idea that those accused of rape are subject to 
capricious convictions. The court then held that the corroboration requirement had outworn its 
usefulness and that it was now a rule without a reason. 
In another South African case of S v M,
164
 even though the court did not take a bold enough 
stance to declare the corroboration requirement unconstitutional, it did recognise its 
discriminatory character. In that case, the appellant had appealed against his conviction on the 
ground that the court had not applied the corroboration rule in a satisfactory manner. The court 
there stated that ‘it is highly problematic to assume automatically that women lie about rape 
when approaching a court’.
165
  
3.1.1   Full and equal protection by the law for women 
The Constitution in section 24 of the Constitution recognises the need for women not to be 
discriminated against as well as the need for the law to afford them full and equal protection by 
the law. Certain specific practices that oppress women like sexual abuse and violence are clearly 
pointed out as targets that the law should aim at eliminating. Yet the corroboration requirement 
stands in stark opposition to such a noble goal. Its discriminatory effect is seen in that it raises 
the standard of proof in sexual offences above that which ordinarily obtains in criminal cases and 
therefore making convictions in sexual offences fewer than warranted. It has been held that in 
sexual cases where there is no corroborative evidence, convictions should be arrived at sparingly. 
In Tinazari v Republic
166
 the High Court said: 
After the [corroboration] warning has been given, an examination of the evidence must be carried out to 
determine whether or not there is material amounting in law to corroboration of the complainant’s account. If 
none is found, two courses are open to a trial court. It can acquit the accused person on the grounds that it is 
dangerous to convict on the uncorroborated evidence of the complainant, or in a suitable case it can accept the 
testimony given notwithstanding the lack of corroboration. One would think, with respect, that the latter course 
should be adopted only in rare instances when the trial court must expressly record (i) that there is no 
corroboration; (ii) that it is aware of the danger of convicting in such circumstances; (iii) that despite the defect it 
is nevertheless satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant is telling the truth. 
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In R v. Kaluwa,
167
 Cram J. stated that ‘only exceptionally, in the absence of corroboration, does a 
reasonable doubt not arise’. 
Even in the face of corroborative evidence, the court is instructed to still be cautious before it 
can find that the charge is proved and thus enter a conviction: 
In cases where corroboration in law is found a conviction is not necessarily automatic but the trial court, after 
giving itself the appropriate warning and after making a finding that there is independent material capable in law 




Despite the fact that the court in Tinazari v Republic stated that the standard of proof in sexual 
offences is proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is arguable that the standard is higher than that, as 
shown by the stricter examination that a complainant’s evidence is put to. In the South African 
case of R v. W,
169
 the court expressly admitted that the standard of proof in sexual offences was 
higher than in the other criminal cases. In that case the court had this to say concerning the 
convicting of an accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence 
case: 
A conviction is competent. But what is required is that a trier of facts should have clearly in mind that these cases 
of sexual assault require special treatment, that charges of this kind are generally difficult to disprove and that 
various considerations may lead to their being falsely laid…Had the charge against the appellant been, for 
instance, one of theft, requiring no more than the ordinary high but not exceptional standard of careful 
scrutiny…the verdict of guilty must have stood.
170
 
Yet this high standard is required in types of cases where corroboration is so hard to find. As the 
court rightly pointed out in Tinazari v Republic, ‘people who commit [sexual offences] normally 
refrain from doing so in the full view of the public’.
171
 Bronstein quotes Estrich and also 
Vogelman about the difficulties in finding corroboration in rape cases.
172
 Estrich writes: 
In a rape, corroboration may be difficult to find. In most cases there are no witnesses. The event cannot be 
repeated for the tape-recorder as bribes or drug sales are. There is no contraband, no drugs, no marked money, no 
stolen goods. Unless the victim actively resists, her clothes may be untorn and her body unmarked…On the 
surface, at least, rape seems to be a crime for which corroboration may be uniquely absent. 
Vogelman quotes a rapist who explains how he makes sure that the complainant is left with no 
outward marks of violence after the rape. He writes: 
If one or two smacks don’t help, then kick her in the ribs, so that she feels the pain inside and there are no marks 
or scars. That’s why I never use a knife on a cherry…I will tell you my approach—I walk with her and talk with 
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her. I always have an alibi and no one can see me dragging her and pulling her. We walk past the shopping centre, 
walking and talking and everyone can see I’m not dragging her. 
In the final analysis then, unwarranted acquittals take place, as observed by the court in the South 
African case of R v M,
173
 that the corroboration requirement was ‘securing the acquittal of many 
a wrongdoer’. There can be no effective deterrence where the law impliedly condones the 
misdeeds of sexual offenders and therefore no effective or full protection of women against such 
predation can be achieved. Acquittals come about because trial courts become disinclined to 
convict in the absence of corroborative evidence. At the same time, the High Court on review or 
appeal is likely to acquit an accused where the trial court did not show on the record that it 
appreciated the need for corroborative evidence.
174
 Thus the High Court will acquit based on the 
single mistake committed by the trial court--of having completely believed the complainant’s 




3.2   The right to dignity 
The corroboration requirement also offends the right to dignity for women. The Malawian 
Constitution expressly states in Section 19 that: 
(1) The dignity of all persons shall be inviolable. 
(2) In any judicial proceedings…respect for human dignity shall be guaranteed.’  
The right to equality is inextricably connected to the right to dignity. This can be seen in the 
Canadian case of Law v. Canada
176
 where the court said: 
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and self-worth. It is harmed when individuals 
and groups are marginalised, ignored, devalued, and is enhanced when laws recognise the full place of all 
individuals and groups within Canadian society. Hence dignity within the meaning of the equality guarantee does 
not relate to the status or position of an individual in society per se, but rather concerns the manner in which a 
person legitimately feels when confronted with a particular law. Does the law treat him or her unfairly, taking into 
account all the circumstances regarding the individuals affected and excluded by the law?
177
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The corroboration requirement demeans women as it ascribes to them the status of ‘unreliable 
witnesses’ in sexual offences and that without justification. This devaluing of women occurs in 
judicial proceedings and thus is contrary to section 19(2) of the Constitution quoted above.  
In the South African case of S v M,
178
 Cameron JA stated that the constitutional requirement 
to dignity demands that if the possibility of malicious motive is to be used as a defence in a 
sexual case, that motive should be canvassed in the complainant’s evidence.
179
 He stated that 
other complainants in other criminal cases are not subjected to such free-ranging speculations 
about malicious motives for making a false sexual offence accusation. He gave the example of ‘a 
commercial director in a commercial setting, who seeks to establish that a gain was of a 
commercial nature, rather than income’ as being ‘spared the indignity of ex post facto 
imputations of and about free-ranging speculations about motive’.
180
  
In this case of S v M, the complainant alleged that she had been indecently assaulted by the 
appellant on a number of occasions since she had been 15 years old. She also alleged that later 
on the appellant had raped her. After the rape, the two had had sexual intercourse on a number of 
occasions in which she never offered any resistance and in which she said she just submitted 
herself to the appellant or maybe gave her consent. The complainant had been a babysitter to the 
appellant’s two children during the period of the alleged crimes. She only reported the 
allegations to the police when she was 18 years old. As the court considered the appeal, it also 
had to examine the possible motive the complainant might have had for laying the charge for at 
the trial, suggestions had been made that the complainant could have had jealous motives against 
the appellant. It was also suggested that the complainant might have felt that she had been misled 
by the appellant that the two were in a relationship and that therefore she was now filled with 
embittered chagrin. Such a jealous motive was said to arise from the incident that the 
complainant had testified to about the appellant having fondled his wife in her presence. He then 
had left the marital bedroom door open while the complainant lay in bed in the next room with 
the children so that the complainant could hear the appellant and his wife’s love-making. She had 
also testified that the following morning the appellant had told her that he had done that 
deliberately so that she could hear since she had rebuffed his advances the previous day. 
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Cameron JA said that the appeal court could not deal with the questions of a jealous motive or 
embittered chagrin at that appeal stage since the complainant had not at the trial been cross 
examined on these as regards them being motives for laying a false charge and that therefore she 
had had no opportunity to deal with them; nor had they been mentioned in argument. All she had 
been asked is whether the open-door incident made her jealous but that this had not been put to 
her as a motive for laying a false charge. Cameron J stated that, at the end, all that was put to her 
at the trial was that she was filled with an unspecified hatred against the appellant and that she 
just wanted to ruin him. Without the malicious motives allegations having been properly 
substantiated by evidence, Cameron JA said, such jealous motives could not be attributed to the 
complainant unless one were to ‘regard women as incipiently inclined to destructive jealousy’.
181
  
3.3   The rights limitation provision and the discriminatory effect of the corroboration 
requirement 
The corroboration requirement has been shown to discriminate against women and subjecting 
them to indignity. We will therefore pass it under the limitation clause to see if the limitation it 
brings to the right women have to equality before the law and also to dignity is justified. Under 
section 44(1) (g) of the Constitution, it is stated that there is to be no derogation, restriction or 
limitation with regard to the right to equality and recognition before the law. Chirwa believes 
that the framers of the Constitution made a mistake when they stated that this right and others in 
the same section are not to be limited or restricted.
182
 This is so because, among other things, he 
envisages that the right to equality can justifiably be limited on account of age and mental 
capacity. He believes the correct view is to see the rights in this section as non-derogable and 
only to be derogated from during a state of emergency. Still, he considers these rights limitable 
whenever the occasion justifies it.  
That being a convincing argument, we will proceed on the footing that the right to equality 
before the law and the right to dignity are limitable. Section 44(2) and (3) of the Constitution 
prescribes the requirements that need to be satisfied before a limitation on a right can be 
sanctioned as legal. Section 44(2) states: 
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…no restrictions or limitations may be placed on the exercise of any rights and freedoms provided for in this 
Constitution other than those prescribed by law, which are reasonable, recognised by international human rights 
standards and necessary in an open and democratic society. 
Then section 44(3) states: 
Laws prescribing restrictions and limitations shall not negate the essential content of the right or freedom in 
question, shall be of general application (sic). 
Further still, one of the principles of national policy in section 12(v) states that: 
as all persons have equal status before the law, the only justifiable limitations to lawful rights are those necessary 
to ensure peaceful human interaction in an open and democratic society; 
As such, there is need to pass the corroboration rule under the tests of: whether it is prescribed by 
law; whether it is of general application; whether it is reasonable; whether it is recognised by 
international human rights standards; whether it is necessary in an open and democratic society; 
and whether it does not negate the essential content of the right to equality before the law and the 
right to dignity. 
3.3.1   Prescribed by law 
The corroboration requirement is a common law rule. By section 200 of the Constitution, all the 
common law rules in force at the commencement of the Constitution were to continue to have 
the force of law unless repealed by an Act of Parliament or declared unconstitutional by a 
competent court. The corroboration requirement was a common law rule at the time the 
Constitution came into force and no law has been enunciated to abolish it since that time. It 
therefore continues to have the force of law. 
3.3.2   General application 
What the element of general application entails is that laws must apply impersonally to everyone 
equally and must not target specific persons without proper justification.
183
 There may be 
instances where a law may be targeted at specific persons and the situation can be perfectly just. 
In Railway Express Agency v New York,
184
 the Police Commissioner of New York had 
promulgated a regulation that no person was to operate an advertising vehicle on any street if the 
vehicle was merely being used to advertise commodities on its exterior sides and if such 
advertising space was being sold to the owners of those commodities for advertising purposes. 
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The owners of commodities who had advertisements on their vehicles and were operating the 
vehicles on the road for the owners’ usual business and not merely for advertising were expressly 
made exempt from this regulation. The justification for the regulation was said to be that the 
advertisements were distractions that posed a danger to road users. Railway Express Agency 
contravened the regulation and was fined. It argued that the advertisements on the owners’ 
vehicles were equally a distraction just like the advertisements Railway Express Agency had put 
on the space of the exteriors of its vehicles by selling this space to the owners of the 
commodities. The appellate court held that the application of the regulation to the class of 
vehicle operators who were only advertisers and not owners of the commodities was justified in 
the circumstances even though both cases posed equal dangers, as it was feared that more and 
more people would venture into the business of advertising space. What the court said would be 
objectionable, was if the regulation was applied differentially on arbitrary grounds, like the type 
of commodity advertised on the space, within the class of those who were advertising by selling 
advertising space. The court thus affirmed that laws may apply to a particular group only, if there 
is justification for such, and that within that group, the law was to be applied equally without 
arbitrary distinctions. The court stated: 
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we should not forget today, that there is no more effective practical 
guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials 
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary action 
so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and 
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. Courts can 
take no better measure to ensure that laws will be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
185
 
Looking at the corroboration requirement, it is a rule that applies to a certain category of people, 
namely, complainants of sexual assaults. It is a rule that on the face of it, applies to all 
complainants in sexual offence cases, whether male or female. In practice, however, it applies 
more to women than men since the majority of sexual complainants are female. This type of 
discrimination is what is termed indirect discrimination.
186
 This is a type of discrimination which 
appears neutral on the surface but which in practice discriminates against a person or class of 
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persons based on a prohibited ground. Chirwa
187
 quotes the dictum in the Botswanan case of 
Moatswi & Another v Fencing Centre (Pty) Ltd
188
 where the court stated that: 
Indirect discrimination is harder to identify. It occurs where an employer applies a rule which ostensibly applies 
neutrally to all employees; but the application of the rule has a disproportionate negative effect on one group. It 
may occur by way of occupational segregation where women are concentrated in sectors which are ‘traditionally’ 
female and that are less well paid. It may occur by way of the provision of a ‘head of household’ allowance or 
benefit, when ‘head of household’ is defined as men in the relevant legislation or policy. It may manifest when 
ostensibly neutral criteria are required for a vacancy or promotion.
189
 
Thus the seemingly neutral criterion which is to the effect that the corroboration rule applies to 
all complainants in sexual cases regardless of their sex has a disproportionate effect on women. 
Therefore we have to enquire if such an action is justified. 
3.3.3   Is it reasonable? 
Reasonableness is understood to mean firstly, that the law must not be arbitrary in that it must 
aim at achieving a specified purpose.
190
 Secondly, it means that the limitation must be 
proportional to the desired end; the limitation must not overly restrict the right than is needed to 
achieve the purpose intended by the limitation.
191
 
The corroboration requirement is stated to exist for the purpose of lessening wrongful 
convictions in sexual offence cases. Yet there are less stringent measures already in place that 
assure an accused of a fair trial, whether in a sexual offence or otherwise. For example, the court 
must acquit an accused person at the close of the prosecution case, if there is insufficient 
evidence implicating the accused.
192
 The accused has the right to challenge and adduce evidence 
in his trial.
193
 The corroboration requirement, however, as already pointed out is essentially a 
prior determination that where there is no corroborative evidence, the accused will have to be 
acquitted. 
3.3.4   Recognised by international human rights standards 
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Chirwa states that recognition by international human rights standards can either mean 
recognition of the limitation in international human rights law or by legal systems of democratic 
countries.
194
 This requirement that the limitation should be recognised by international human 
rights standards accords with one of the principles of the interpretation of the Malawi 
Constitution, which is to the effect that courts are obliged to have regard to current norms of 
public international law and comparable case law.
195
  
Apart from the provisions in the Constitution, Malawi has obligations in the international 
community, to ensure that women are not discriminated against and also that they have equal 
status with any other person before the law. The Constitution provides that binding international 
agreements entered into before the commencement of the Constitution shall continue to be in 
force unless otherwise provided by an Act of Parliament.
196
 Among those instruments that 
Malawi is still a party and to which it acceded to before the present Constitution came into force 
is the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination against women. Malawi 
acceded to this convention on 12th March 1987.
197
 The convention enjoins state parties to 
abolish laws that discriminate against women.
198
 The call for member states to ensure that 
women are not revictimised by violence through laws insensitive to gender considerations is also 
to be found in the UN Declaration on the Elimination of violence against women.
199
 
The corroboration requirement is a creature of the common law which Malawi inherited from 
England. The UK, however, jettisoned the rule more than a decade ago.
200
 Other common law 
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have abrogated the rule. 
 3.3.5   Necessary in an open and democratic society 
The limitation must be necessary in an open and democratic society. The Canadian limitation of 
rights provision uses the phrase ‘free and democratic society’
207
 which essentially equates with 
the ‘open and democratic society’ phrase in the Malawi Constitution. This free and democratic 
society is described as one which possesses the values and underlying principles of  
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, commitment to social justice and equality, accommodation 
of a wide variety of beliefs, respect for cultural and group identity, and faith in social and political institutions 
which enhance the participation of individuals and groups in society.
208
  
It is stated that when a person feels equal before the law, he feels that his dignity is respected and 
therefore his sense of self-worth is reinforced. He then becomes a useful and contributing 




The corroboration requirement, therefore, has to be shown to be addressing a need that is 
necessary in such an open and free society. Yet the actual effect of it is not to lessen wrongful 
convictions but to sanction unwarranted acquittals of sexual offenders and hence affording less 
protection for women against sexual offences. The sense of women’s self-worth is undermined 
such that women are hindered from being productive members of society. Women cannot 
participate fully in the advancement of societal goals if they are oppressed by sexual predation 
and also if the law itself endorses stereotypes and prejudices. 
3.3.6   Essential content of the rights to equality before the law and right to dignity 
The corroboration requirement strikes at the heart of the rights to equality before the law and 
dignity for women and denies those rights to them. This law perpetuates the stereotype in society 
against women which is to the effect that women are not worth of belief in the sexual assault 
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accusations that they make. It denies them protection of their physical and psychological 
integrity in sexual violations. Women are physically and psychologically victimised in the sexual 
assault and they are further psychologically victimised by the law which will not readily believe 
their victimisation account. Thus they are exposed to further sexual victimisation since they are 
seen as having no effective protection. 
4.   A case for reform 
From the above analysis, it can doubtless be observed that the corroboration requirement is 
unconstitutional. It is a quintessential example of such laws that are discriminatory and 
degrading to women. It is also detrimental to women as it perpetuates their oppression through 
sexual violations. Section 24(2) of the Constitution which provides for the invalidation of any 
law that discriminates against women should therefore be invoked in regard to the corroboration 
requirement. This provision specifically speaks of legislation being passed to eliminate practices 
that discriminate against women and mentions sexual abuse as one of such practices. Before 
even such laws can be passed, the abolition of the corroboration requirement would be the easiest 
starting point. Additionally, Malawi will thereby be complying with its obligations on the 
international scene in relation to the protection of the rights of women. 





















ABOLISHING THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT 
From the last chapter, we have seen how the corroboration requirement is an unconstitutional 
rule with its discriminatory and devaluing effect on women. The only plausible option therefore 
would be to do away with it. The Constitution states that any law that is inconsistent with it 
should be declared invalid by a competent court.
210
 Additionally, as a principle of national 
policy, it is stated that the state shall actively promote the welfare and development of the people 
of Malawi by progressively adopting and implementing policies and legislation aimed at 
achieving such goals as gender equality.
211
 Gender equality is to be achieved, among other 
things, by the implementation of principles of non-discrimination.
212
 
Therefore current laws that discriminate against women can either be invalidated by the court 
or they can be repealed by Parliament. In their stead, new laws can be enacted which are 
premised on non-discrimination. 
The corroboration requirement is judge-made law and therefore, it would seem quite logical 
that it should be overruled by the courts themselves. While a declaration of the rule as 
unconstitutional would be a very important step towards abolishing the rule, it is also desirable to 
have a law specifically outlawing it. Indeed that has been the approach of most of the common 
law countries that have abolished the rule: the wave of reform started with judicial invalidation 
of the rule and culminated in statutory enactment. 
In this chapter, we will consider the judicial reform of the rule in the three jurisdictions of the 
United States, Canada and South Africa and the bases for the reforms.  We will then turn to the 
UK statutory reform of the rule. Further, we will consider how the statutory reform has taken 
effect in the notable case authority of R v. Makanjuola; R v. Eaton.
213
 It is our recommendation 
that in addition to the judicial declaration of the rule as unconstitutional and therefore invalid, 
Malawi should take lessons from this legislative reform of England with its application structure 
in the above stated case authority. 
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4.1   Judicial Reform 
4.1.1 United States 
The earliest judicial reform of the corroboration requirement is that of the state of California in 
the case of People v Rincon-Pineda.
214
 In that case, the trial judge had acknowledged the 
mandatory nature of the corroboration warning in sexual cases but then expressed the view that 
the warning had not come under proper scrutiny for ages.
215
 He therefore refused to give a 
corroboration warning to the jury on the ground that it discriminated against women and did not 
afford them equal protection of the law.
216
 The appellate court did point out that the 
corroboration requirement was still law up to that time and that the accused was entitled to the 
benefits of the law existing at that particular time. Nevertheless, the appellate court found that 
the accused had not suffered any prejudice by the trial judge’s omission to give the corroboration 
requirement warning.
217
 It was stated that the accused had been granted a trial of due process, for 
he had been accorded a jury trial and had been represented by counsel.
218
 He had also been 
accorded the presumption of innocence until he was proven guilty. Further, his guilt could only 
be established beyond reasonable doubt.
219
 The court then went on to examine the history of the 
rule, its historical legal context, its rationale and the efficacy of its continued application in the 
present day legal context. The court came to the conclusion that the corroboration requirement 
had outworn its usefulness and that it was not to be given mandatory application. 
The court traced the origins of the corroboration rule in sexual offences to the writings of 
Hale published in 1736 from which came the oft-quoted statement for the justification of the 
corroboration warning that, ‘rape is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved and 
harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so innocent’.
220
 The court, however, 
put Sir Hale’s writings in both their textual and historical context for a correct interpretation and 
observed that the writings showed that Sir Hale himself did not regard every rape as a potential 
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 Further, it was stated that the writings revealed that Sir Hale was convinced that 
the jury were the best judges of a complainant’s credibility.
222
 The court also stated that there 
was nothing in Sir Hale’s writing that was to the effect that the trial judge should as a matter of 
course instruct the jury that sexual offence complainants are worthy less of belief than victims of 
other offences.
223
 The credibility of a witness was to be judged by the ‘circumstances of the 
alleged crime and the narration of it by the witness’ and ‘that these circumstances vary markedly 
from case to case’.
224
 
Further to this, Chief Justice Wright stated that even if Hale’s writings were to be construed as 
directing a mandatory corroboration warning to the jury, there had taken place major 
improvements in the criminal justice system since Sir Hale’s days so that the rule lacked validity 
in the present world.
225
 In Hale’s days, an accused could not testify in his own defence; he could 
only make an unsworn statement.
226
 Although it was recognised then, that an accused was to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt, that proposition had not 
forcefully been enshrined as a right. The accused’s right to summon witnesses and to compel 
them to attend trial was not sufficiently recognised. One accused of a felony such as rape was not 
allowed to have the services of legal counsel. The Chief Justice contrasted the position of an 
accused in Hale’s day with the scenario in modern days.  In that day, the accused in a rape trial 
had to defend himself against the accusation on the conviction of which he would face a death 
penalty. He had to do this without counsel or witnesses and without being ‘clothed in the 
presumption of innocence’ or ‘shielded by the need of his guilt to be proved beyond reasonable 
doubt ere he could be convicted’.
227
  In modern society, all the due process requirements are 
accorded to the accused. 
On the issue of a rape allegation being easy to make and hard to be defended against, the court 
considered the statistics and established that rape is a highly underreported crime.
228
 
Additionally, the court noted that among the FBI’s four violent crimes, the rate of acquittals is 
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the highest for rape.
229
 The said four violent crimes are murder, forcible rape, robbery and 
aggravated assault. 
Thus considering the rule’s origin, it could not be proved from Sir Hale’s writings that there 
was to be a corroborative warning in every sexual case. The rule’s rationale found no support in 
the rape data for the statistics of reporting and convictions did not correlate with the claims of 
easiness of fabrication and difficulty in defending of rape charges. Further, the criminal justice 
system of the modern world granted an accused a wide range of rights that ensure a fair trial.  
The risk of convicting innocent accused was thus seen to be extremely slim. The rule thus served 
no useful purpose.  
4.1.2   Canada 
In Canada, there were three prominent cases with regard to the reform of the corroboration 
requirement in sexual cases. All of them were Supreme Court decisions. These cases are R v 
Warkentin,
230
 R v Murphy and Butt
231
 and R v Vetrovec.
232
 The first two cases were rape cases. 
The third one involved accomplice evidence which was also a category of evidence requiring a 
corroboration warning prior to the abolition of the rule with regard to accomplice evidence. 
Although this case did not involve a sexual offence, the court expressly stated that the dictum 
was applicable to all other instances where corroboration was required under the common law. 
Additionally, this case endorsed the approach adopted in the other two earlier cases.  
In all these cases, the Supreme Court of Canada was forced to go back in history to see how 
the term ‘corroboration’ had been understood in its early development in order for it to create a 
justification for relaxing the strictness of the corroboration requirement that the Baskerville 
formula prescribed. It felt compelled to do this because of the facts that presented themselves in 
the cases before them and the difficulties that the corroboration requirement posed to those facts. 
The first case was of R v Warkentin.
233
 In that case, four men had grabbed an eighteen year old 
Indian girl who was on her way to a dance at a hotel and who was already within the vicinity of 
the hotel. They threw her into a red Mustang car and drove to a secluded place. There they forced 
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her out of the car and threw her to the ground. Two men held her arms to prevent her from 
struggling. The third had sexual intercourse with her and the fourth stood nearby laughing. 
There were five pieces of evidence identified by the trial judge which he considered could 
amount to corroboration. The four men had made written admissions that they had been together 
at the dance and also that they had been together earlier in the evening. They also admitted that 
the red Mustang belonged to one of them. Further, they admitted that the red Mustang was 
parked outside the dance with no one in it at the time of their arrest. Secondly, there was the 
distraught condition of the complainant when she was picked up by her friend along the road. 
The police officer and the doctor also testified about her distraught condition at the time they 
spoke to her. The third piece of potential corroborative evidence was the semen found in her 
vagina and on her panty. Fourthly, there was the Caucasian scalp hair found on her jeans, which 
hair was similar to that which was found on the clothing of one of the accused. Finally, there 
were also pine needles found in the crotch of the complainant’s clothes. 
Only three of the accused were the appellants in this appeal. It was argued on their behalf that 
there were three issues involved in the case, which were, intercourse, lack of consent and 
identity. Thus, it was argued that the corroborative evidence had to confirm each of these three 
issues in relation to each accused person if the corroborative evidence was to be of the standard 
required, which was that it should implicate the accused in a material particular. 
De Grandpre delivering the judgment for the majority stated that corroboration was not a term 
of art but a matter of common sense.
234
 He turned to the English cases that had just been decided 
in the three years prior to the present case. These were DPP v Hester
235
 and DPP v Kilbourne.
236
 
In both these cases, the courts had stated that in the early days, corroboration had been a term of 
common sense and that it simply meant evidence that confirmed other evidence. He also stated 
that the Supreme Court of Canada had in some recent years prior to this case refused to apply the 
more restrictive meaning that was based on R v Baskerville.
237
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He thus held that what was needed was that the corroborative evidence relate to the people in 
the group.
238
 It did not matter that all the four people in the group did not actually have sexual 
intercourse with her. The law would treat the one who actually had the sexual intercourse with 
the girl as a principal. The other two holding her arms in order to enable the principal to have 
sexual intercourse with her were stated to be aiders. The one laughing while the principal had 
sexual intercourse with her was abetting the offence. Still, aiders and abettors suffered the same 
consequences as the principal.
239
 Thus it did not really matter that it be pointed out who actually 
had had the sexual intercourse with her so long as the corroborative evidence taken together 
confirmed that this was the group of the four who were party to the rape. De Grandpre therefore 
stated that:    
When the indictment alleges, as in the case at bar, that a gang rape has been committed, the same common sense 
approach must be adopted. To insist that nine separate issues be submitted to the jury, namely, intercourse, 
absence of consent and identity, in relation to each of the accused individually, is to forget the realities of life; 
rape being a crime of the shadows, the Crown would never be in a position to adduce evidence of such a quality 
as to satisfy the criteria when applied separately to nine different issues. On that basis, one can well imagine the 
difficulties in the way of the Crown if the rape had been committed by six, eight or ten persons. It is no answer to 
state that in the light of s. 142 a conviction could always be entered on the basis of the complainant’s evidence; 
Parliament had not enacted that corroboration would not be vailable in the case of gang rape.
240
 
The court thus had recourse to the meaning of corroboration as ‘confirmation’ as it has been used 
in the earliest legal development of the term in order to relax the application of the corroboration 
requirement. Only with this relaxed definition did the court hope to have the corroboration 
requirement fulfilled, which requirement went beyond the common law but was actually 
expressed in a statutory enactment. 
This relaxed approach was also employed in the case of R. v. Murphy and Butt
241
 which was 
discussed earlier,
242
 whereby it was held that so long as the corroborative evidence confirmed 
one part of the complainant’s story, the whole of her evidence would be believed. The reasoning 
was that if it could be shown that she had told the truth in one part, she then established herself to 
be a credible witness. In that case, it was held that so long as the corroborative evidence showed 
that she was telling the truth that one of the accused had had intercourse with her without her 
consent, she would be believed, without further corroborative evidence supporting the rest of her 
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story which stated that the other accused too had had sexual intercourse with her without her 
consent.    
These difficulties of a law that prescribes that the corroborative evidence should implicate 
each accused where there are more than one accused also arose in R v. Vetrovec.
243
 This was a 
case of heroin trafficking and the two appellants and seven others had been charged in the 
offence. An accomplice testified in the matter.  Although his evidence implicated both 
appellants, the corroborative evidence that was found only implicated one appellant. Dickson J 
drew on Warkentin and Murphy for the proposition that corroboration meant confirmation and 
that once a suspect witness’ evidence was confirmed in one part of the story, then the whole of 
his/her story was to be accepted as true.   He further went on to examine the justification for 
having such a special rule of evidence applying to a particular class of witnesses such as 
accomplices and found such justifications to be lacking in merit. He stated that a judge is not 
required in all cases to warn the jury in regard to evidence of ‘witnesses with disreputable and 
untrustworthy backgrounds’.
244
 He therefore stated that: 
There is nothing inherent in the evidence of an accomplice which automatically renders it untrustworthy. To 
construct a universal rule singling out accomplices, then is to fasten upon this branch of the law of evidence a 
blind and empty formalism. Rather than attempting to pigeon-hole a witness into a category and then recite a 
ritualistic incantantion, the trial judge might better direct his mind to the facts of the case, and thoroughly 
examine all the factors which might impair the truth of a particular witness. If, in his judgment, the credit of the 
witness is such that the jury should be cautioned, then he may instruct accordingly. If, on the other hand, he 




The court thus outlawed the mandatory corroboration warning with regard to evidence of an 
accomplice. Dickson J also stated that his comments extended to all cases where corroboration 
was required by the common law. Therefore the comments were applicable to the evidence of the 
other class of witnesses, namely complainants of sexual offences, even though the court did not 
specifically abolish the corroboration requirement with reference to them in this particular case. 
Zuckerman comments that this was a very bold step for the court to take in the way of judicial 
reform of the common law, for courts are hesitant to be seen as usurping the legislature’s 
prerogative of making laws. He explains that the Supreme Court of Canada was encouraged to 
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take the step because ‘it had in front of it the report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada 
which contained a thorough survey of corroboration and which recommended the abolition of 
the…rules’.
246
 The court also had support from the 11
th




4.1.3   South Africa 
In South Africa, the corroboration requirement was abolished in S v. Jackson,
248
 for lack of a 
legitimate justification as to its very existence and being found only to be premised on 
discrimination against women.
249
 In that case, the accused had been convicted of attempted rape. 
On appeal, the defence counsel contended that the trial court had not properly directed itself as to 
corroboration. The prosecution argued that the corroboration requirement was not to be 
sanctioned anymore by the courts for it was discriminatory against women and that it was raising 
the burden of proof in sexual offences above the usual standard of proof in criminal cases.
250
 The 
court therefore examined the rationale for the rule’s existence, which rationale claims the 
easiness with which false sexual offence accusation can be made and the difficulty of refuting 
them. The court found this idea to be insupportable with empirical research.
251
 Actually the court 
found that bringing a rape accusation is taxing on the complainant: 
Few things may be more difficult and humiliating than for a woman to cry rape: she is often within certain 
communities, considered to have lost her credibility; she may be seen as unchaste or unworthy of respect; her 
community may turn their back on her; she has to undergo the most harrowing cross examination in court, where 
the intimate details of the crime are transversed ad nauseam; she (but not the accused may be required to reveal 
her previous sexual history; she may disqualify herself in the marriage market, and many husbands turn their back 
on a ‘soiled’ wife.
252  
The court agreed with the prosecution that the corroboration requirement does indeed 
unnecessarily raise the standard of proof in a sexual case above that which is ordinarily 
applicable in criminal cases. The court considered legal trends in comparable jurisdictions of the 
UK, Canada, New Zealand, United States and Namibia and saw that the corroboration 
requirement had been abolished there. Olivier JA therefore finding no proper justification for the 
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rule’s existence nor its retention concluded that it was discriminatory against women and thus 
needed to be abrogated. He stated: 
The cautionary rule in sexual assault cases is based on irrational and outdated perceptions. It unjustly stereotypes 
complainants in sexual assault cases (overwhelmingly women) as particularly unreliable.
253
 
According to him, the only instance where a witness’ testimony was to be approached with 
caution was when there was an evidential basis for doing so. He went on to endorse the approach 
of England in regard to the reform it had made in the area of the common law requirement of 
corroboration. After its legislative abolition of the corroboration requirement in sexual offences 
and other evidence, the English courts were still to exercise caution with regard to a particular 
witness’ testimony if there was an evidential basis for such. They were not, however, to exercise 
caution merely on the basis that the witness belonged to a class of witnesses of which the 
corroboration requirement had been applied in the past. This appr ach was based on the English 
authority of R v Makanjuola,
254
 a case which was decided after the legislative abrogation of the 
corroboration requirement. Olivier JA therefore stated that the courts should look to this case for 
guidance on the circumstances in which the court would be justified to examine a witness’ 
testimony more carefully. 
Although S v Jackson’s message was clear that the corroboration requirement was abrogated, 
some later cases interpreted it to mean that a general corroboration rule was not to be applied to 
the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence case, but that caution, was still to be applied 
before convicting of a sexual offence. S v Van der Ross
255
 is a case in point where such an 
interpretation was made. The headnote reads: 
The judgment in S v J…does not mean that trial courts are free to convict in an indiscriminate and reckless 
manner and reckless manner where the charge is of a sexual nature. It also does not mean that in those cases 
courts no longer have to be cautious. On the contrary, criminal courts should be encouraged to exercise extreme 
caution before they convict people on serious charges, such as rape…All that the judgment in S v Jackson means 
is that a general, immutable cautionary rule does not have to be applied to the evidence of the complainant in such 
cases. The evidence in a particular case may call for a cautious approach. It will depend on the facts and the 
circumstances of each individual case.
256
  
The South African Law Commission had feared these kinds of misinterpretations of S v Jackson 
and therefore had proposed the express abolition of the corroboration requirement through 
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The result was the unequivocal legislative abolition of the corroboration requirement 
which stated that the evidence of a complainant in a sexual case was not to be treated with 
caution on account of the nature of the offence.
258
  
4.2   Bases for judicial reform within the jurisdictions 
Having examined the judicial reforms that were effected in California, Canada and South Africa, 
the observation to be made is that the courts came to the realisation that the corroboration 
requirement had no rational basis other than the discrimination of women. The South African 
court made that plain. The trial court in Rincon-Pineda
259
 had expressly given the reason of 
discrimination against women for its refusal to apply the corroboration requirement. The 
appellate court may not have put the reason for abolition in the language of discrimination 
against women, but that essence is implicit in the approach the court took of confronting the 
rationale for the rule’s existence and establishing it to be baseless. Thus the court could not 
sanction the retention of a rule that made distinctions between complainants of sexual offences 
and those of other criminal cases when there were no reasonable grounds for making the 
distinctions. 
As regards the Canadian reforms, there is also the tacit acknowledgement that the 
corroboration requirement is irrational and also discriminatory. The relaxation of the Baskerville 
test showed that the courts saw no reason for doubting the sexual complainant’s testimony 
merely on the basis that they complained of a sexual offence. Such a baseless distinction was 
uncalled for and yet, the courts could not just easily abolish it, arguably because in Canada 
unlike other jurisdictions the rule was not just embodied in judicial pronouncements but was also 
expressed in a statutory enactment.
260
 The courts therefore might have felt that they would be 
encroaching on Parliament’s territory as explained by Zuckerman. Only when the court felt such 
support for reform did it abolish it in Vetrovec. It was only at that stage that the court expressed 
the view that the reason for abolition was not merely that the Baskerville formula was stringent 
but that the differentiation that was being made with regards to the testimony of certain classes of 
witnesses was irrational.  
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After these judicial reforms, all these three countries still went on to enact statutory provisions 
for the abrogation of the corroboration requirement. 
4.3   Legislative Reform 
In almost every country where the corroboration requirement has been abolished, whether the 
abolition was first effected through judicial pronouncement, there has also followed the 
legislative abolition of the rule.
261
 Below we consider the UK legislative abolition of the rule as a 
model which Malawi can follow. The English approach is a good example for Malawi because 
Malawi used to be a British colony and also because it inherited the corroboration requirement 
from England as well. Much of the common law is until now still part of the laws of Malawi. 
The British, therefore, having moved away from the rule, Malawi can learn lessons from them on 
how such a move can be made. Additionally, the English approach has not just stopped at 
abrogating the rule statutorily. It has gone further through the case authority of R v Makanjuola; 
R v. Eaton
262
 to set out the ambit of the reform and to explain that there could still be instances 
where the evidence of a witness may need to be examined more carefully, though not just on the 
basis that the witness belongs to a class where corroboration requirement has been stated to 
apply in the past. Therefore for the reason that the corroboration rule is a rule Malawi inherited 
from the British and that the common law still applies to Malawi and also for the satisfactory 
way in which they have applied the reforms without at the same time, being oblivious to the fact 
that some witnesses’ testimonies need to be viewed with caution, we proceed to consider the 
British reform.   
In UK, the corroboration requirement was abrogated by section 32 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 which states that: 
(1) Any requirement whereby at trial on indictment it is obligatory for the court to give the jury a warning about 
convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a person merely because that person is— 
(b) where the offence charged is a sexual offence, the person in respect of whom it is alleged to have 
been committed, is hereby abrogated. 
(2) Any requirement that— 
(a) is applicable at the summary trial of a person for an offence, and 
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(b) corresponds to the requirement mentioned in subsection (1) above…is hereby abrogated. 
In R v. Makanjuola
263
 the two appellants had been charged separately with indecent assault 
and they had had separate trials. Makanjuola was charged with indecent assault on a girl aged 
seventeen years and Eaton was charged with indecent assault on a sixteen year old girl. 
Makanjuola appealed on the ground that since the offence was alleged to have been committed 
before the above provision came into force, the trial judge ought to have given the 
corroboration direction to the jury. Subsection (4) of the above quoted provision stated that the 
abolition section would not apply to trials that had started before the provision came into force. 
Eaton appealed on the ground that even though the provision had abolished the obligation of a 
trial judge to give the corroboration warning, the judge still retained the discretion to give the 
full corroboration direction, and that in this case the discretion ought to have been exercised in 
his favour. His counsel argued that the rationale that complainants lie concerning sexual 
accusations could not vanish overnight. As such, while the requirement to give a warning had 
been abolished, judges were still to exercise their discretion in giving the warning. The 
appellate court held that since both trials started after the abolition came into force, the new law 
would apply to the appellants. The fact that the offences were alleged to have been committed 
before the abolition came into force would not be cause for the new law not to apply 
retrospectively. The court stated that retrospective application of the new law was possible 
because generally a statutory change in procedure does apply to pending as well as future 
proceedings and the court stated that section 32 was a procedural provision.
264
 On the question 
of discretionary warnings, the court was emphatic that the corroboration requirement had been 
abolished and there was never even to be discretionary warnings based on the fact that the 
witness belonged to a certain class of witnesses. The only time the judge was to give a direction 
to the jury to have the evidence of a particular witness viewed with caution was when there was 
an evidential basis for such.
265
 An evidential basis was not to be just a mere suggestion by 
counsel to the effect that the witness was unreliable. Even in those kinds of situations, it was a 
matter for the judge to determine how to couch the warning, ‘depending on the circumstances 
of the case, the issues raised and the content and quality of the witness’s evidence’.
266
 The 
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judge was not to give a warning in the way of Baskerville formula for as pointed out by the 
court, the enactment of this provision was actually Parliament’s way of getting rid of that 
formula that was more of a source of confusion for the jury than a source of guidance. Finally, 
it was stated that the appellate court would be slow to interfere with the judge’s exercise of 
discretion unless it was Wednesbury unreasonable.
267
  
Lord Taylor giving the judgment for the court stated: 
Given that the requirements of a corroboration direction is abrogated in the terms of section 32(1), we have been 
invited to give guidance as to the circumstances in which, as a matter of discretion, a judge ought in summing up 
to a jury to urge caution in regard to a particular witness and the terms in which that should be done. The 
circumstances and evidence in criminal cases are infinitely variable and it is impossible to categorise how a judge 
should deal with them. But it is clear that to carry on giving ‘discretionary’ warnings generally and in the same 
terms as were previously obligatory would be contrary to the policy and purpose of the Act. Whether, as a matter 
of discretion, a judge should give any warning and if so its strength and terms must depend upon the content and 
manner of the witness’s evidence, the circumstances of the case and the issues raised. The judge will often 
consider that no special warning is required at all. Where, however, the witness has been shown to be unreliable, 
he or she may consider it necessary to urge caution. In a more extreme case, if the witness is shown to have lied, 
to have made previous false complaints, or to bear the defendant some grudge, a stronger warning may be thought 
appropriate and the judge may suggest it would be wise to look for some supporting material before acting on the 
impugned witness’s evidence. We stress that these observations are merely illustrative of some, not all, of the 
factors which judges may take into account in measuring where a witness stands in the scale of reliability and 
what response they should make at that level in their directions to the jury. We also stress that judges are not 
required to conform to any formula and this court would be slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion by a 
trial judge who has the advantage of assessing the manner of a witness’s evidence as well as its content.
268  
Lewis has noted that there are two categories of cases that have been distinguished in the 
above dictum.
269
 The first category involves cases in which there is an evidential basis for 
suggesting that the evidence of the witness may be unreliable and a second category where the 
witness has plainly been shown to have lied in her evidence or to have made false complaints.  In 
the first category, caution is urged, for example, where a witness’ evidence is inconsistent within 
itself or where a witness makes a statement inconsistent with an earlier statement
270
 or where 
there is evidence that the complainant is psychologically disturbed.
271
In R v Terry G,
272
 the 
complainant who was aged eight, was taken into care. At that time, she stated on video when 
interviewed, that the appellant had been beating her and her other siblings. She made no 
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allegations about the appellant sexually assaulting her. She was asked if there was anything else 
that was bothering her but she said there was not. On an earlier occasion, she had told a social 
worker that no one had indecently assaulted her. Three months later, she was interviewed again 
and made allegations that the appellant had indecently assaulted her. The trial judge did not make 
a direction to the jury about her evidence being treated with caution for her inconsistent 
statements. On appeal, it was held that the trial judge would have given such a direction had he 
turned his mind to the question. Therefore, the conviction was quashed and a retrial was ordered.  
In R v. Jobe,
273
 one of the complainants had stated that she had been a virgin previous to the 
rape. The evidence called showed that she had lied about this and a strong warning was urged for 
her evidence because of the lie. 
4.4   Recommendation 
Our recommendation is that Malawi should abolish the corroboration requirement both by case 
law and statutorily. At the same time, sight should not be lost that there are occasions when the 
evidence of a witness in a sexual offence case or in any other case may be seen to be unreliable. 
In those cases, caution should be exercised and Makanjuola can provide the necessary guide. 
Since Malawi does not have jury trials in sexual offences, it is up to the trial magistrates 
themselves to weigh up the evidence of a particular witness. They can therefore apply caution in 
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                                                          CONCLUSION 
This paper considered the corroboration requirement in sexual offences in Malawi. This 
evidential rule requiring that the evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence case be supported 
by some other evidence before a safe conviction can be reached has been shown to be the legacy 
of the common law that Malawi inherited from England. Such a requirement has been shown to 
place an increased burden on the prosecution that they need to discharge for them to prove their 
case in sexual offence matters. This increased burden is over and above that which normally 
obtains in all other criminal cases, which is, simply proof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, 
the accused in sexual cases has been afforded protections that are not given to accused persons in 
other criminal matters, making it virtually impossible for him to get convicted. 
The justifications for its existence have been found to be extremely wanting. One of the 
justifications which  is to the effect that sexual offence accusations are easily fabricated and yet 
are hard to be defended against has been examined and has been found to lack any merit, for 
empirical research has shown the contrary. Empirical research has debunked the myth that more 
false accusations are made in the realm of sexual offences than any other felony. Furthermore, it 
has actually been found that sexual offences are quite easy to disprove since the victim is made 
the focus of the trial and a target for blame by the defence team. Instead of the jury being 
sympathetic towards the complainant as it is usually claimed, research shows that the jury are 
also quick to blame the victim, such that they are unlikely to convict the accused in the absence 
of aggravating factors. To this end, rape and sexual offences in general, have been found to have 
the lowest conviction rates among the felonies.   
Even if it may be argued that there may have been some justification for the corroboration 
requirement in the days when it was enunciated, such justification has completely vanished in the 
modern criminal justice system. While in the days of its enunciation the accused’s rights to fair 
trial may have been few and not well-recognised, in the present era, his/her rights are paramount 
and due process abounds. In the modern system, the accused is entitled to be presumed innocent 












testify in his own defence; he is entitled to call witnesses and even to compel their attendance. 
The corroboration requirement therefore has no place in that kind of setting. 
While the corroboration requirement has been found to have no legitimate reason for its 
existence, it has been observed that the rule is only premised on discrimination against women. 
Such being the case, the rule was subjected to the principles of the current Malawian 
Constitution, which principles entail the right to equality before the law, the right to dignity and 
the right of women to be effective protection by the law. The rule could not be defended under 
these principles for the distinction it makes between complainants of sexual offences, who are 
mostly women, and complainants of other criminal cases, was shown to be unreasonable. In the 
final analysis, the rule has been shown to perpetuate sexual violence against women since the 
perpetrators of it are not inadequately dealt with under this rule. 
England, which had given birth to the rule, abrogated it. The other common law democratic 
countries of United States, Canada and South Africa that had inherited the rule have abolished it 
as well on the basis that it is discriminatory against women. Since the rule serves no useful 
purpose in Malawi and also looking at the trend on the international scene, it is only sensible that 
Malawi should abrogate it too. It has been advocated that the Malawian courts should outlaw the 
rule as unconstitutional and therefore invalid. At the same time, it is also expedient that there be 
legislative reform of the rule for the clear and unmistakable dealing away of the rule.  
The paper makes the suggestion that Malawi should adopt the English legislative approach in 
the abolition of the rule. It is further suggested that the courts should take a firm stance in the 
interpretation of such a law abolishing the rule as did the court in Makanjuola so that the 
corroboration requirement in sexual offences should be completely dealt away with. Such 
abolition of the rule will mean that the accused in sexual offences will not be entitled to special 
treatment which is not afforded accused persons in other criminal matters and a sexual offence 
complainant will no longer be subjected to the ‘demeaning presumption against her 
truthfulness’.
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 A complainant’s evidence will only be doubted if there is an evidential for such 
and not simply because he/she is a complainant in a sexual matter.  
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